I met Philip Staros at his Leningrad institute only once, while I was there on business. At that time, I didn't think that I would ever write about him so I did not try to remember every detail of our meeting.

Staros was a popular personality among computer specialists. The UM1-NX (developed at his institute) was the first microelectronic control computer. Even though I and other designers of control computers were familiar with the machine, very few people (including myself) knew that its designer was born, educated, and received his initial microelectronics experience in the United States.

Vitaly Valkov, Staros' colleague of many years, shared with me some details of the relationship between Staros and another American engineer, Iosef Berg.^[2] They were, respectively, the Chief Designer-Constructor and Chief Engineer of KB-2, one of the primary computer design bureaus with strong ties to the Soviet military. It is almost certain that someone in the Soviet government, perhaps Khrushchev himself, helped both Staros and Berg to come to the Soviet Union from Czechoslovakia; both arrived around late 1955, early 1956. Staros came with his American wife and four children; Berg – with his Czech wife.

Valkov suggested that Staros' success in the Soviet Union was due to three factors: the Soviet military managed his work starting in 1956, he had the bearings of a man educated in the United States along with Western engineering experience, and he was a gifted researcher and a skilled manager of large teams.

The military had direct access to the highest levels of the Soviet bureaucracy, thus military projects received high priority and stood a better chance of successful realization.

Although it is not clear who invited Staros to come to the Soviet Union, there is very little doubt that Soviet authorities held him in great regard from the very beginning of his career. His monthly salary was significantly higher than any other scientist's at Zelenograd and even higher than that of many Soviet ministers.^[3]

According to Valkov, Alfred Epaminodas Sarant received his bachelor's degree in electronics from Cooper Union University in New York City in 1941. He worked in communication systems design in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and at a nuclear physics laboratory at Cornell University, where he participated in the construction of a cyclotron. In 1950, he went to work for Bell Laboratories gaining experience in communication systems and radar technology; he also gained some knowledge about the first American computers and electronic equipment for the cyclotron. Until 1944, Sarant was a member of the American Communist Party and he, Berg, and Julius Rosenberg belonged to the same communist party group and spy ring.

Just after the Rosenbergs' arrest in the summer of 1950, the Federal Bureau of Investigation interrogated Sarant. After the interrogation, he received permission to visit his relatives in New York. Shortly after, using false documents, he crossed the American-Mexican border and later appeared in Czechoslovakia; the name ‘Sarant' disappeared from publication. Five years later, the American engineer Phillip Staros arrived in the Soviet Union.

The calculation and control computers designed by Philip Staros received high praise both in the Soviet Union and in the West. In 1964, the popular magazine Soviet Union featured UM1-NX computer, where it was described to weigh 65 kg, and have operating energy consumption of only 100 watts; it consisted of eight thousand transistors with approximately ten thousand resistors and capacitors. During its testing period, it performed failure-free for 250 hours.

A small circle of people close to Staros joked that "NX" stood for Nikita Khrushchev, so it could be said that the computer was named in honor of the benefactor of Staros' construction bureau.^[4]

Another control computer developed by Staros that gained attention in the West was the Electronika K-200. It weighed approximately 120 kilograms and could performed 40 thousand operations per second. The American critics who reviewed this machine remarked, "Many of its features would not be considered original in the West, but the appearance of such features in a Soviet computer is extremely uncommon. The K-200 was the first Soviet-produced computer that may be considered well-designed and amazingly up-to-date." They even complimented the use of contemporary English technical jargon that accompanied the description of the machine. Naturally, had the critics known that the machine's designer was an American electrical engineer who followed American developments in this field, they would not have been so surprised or generous with their praise.

Whatever the source of his knowledge, it must be recognized that Staros was able to achieve many significant accomplishments during his time in the Soviet Union.

One of Staros' Soviet colleagues, who now lives in the West, claims that Staros was first in the Soviet Union to draw attention to the new field of computer technology, which is now called microelectronics. Staros took the first step in this direction during a presentation on microelectronics in November 1958. All of the principal developers and leaders of design bureaus, representing the entire Soviet electronics industry, were present at this meeting.

In 1961, a new powerful State Committee was formed. In 1965, it was followed by the Ministry of the Electronic Industry, headed by Alexander Shokin. The purpose for creating this ministry was to increase the production of basic electronic components without which it was impossible to make radar equipment or computers. The government pinned enormous hopes on the Ministry of the Electronic Industry and its placement in the middle of the so-called "nine sisters" – nine industrial ministries, most of which were involved in defense production. Shokin's position was very strong and vulnerable at the same time because he was under constant pressure to produce practical results. This explains why he was so willing to support Staros and his plans. But by encouraging Staros to expand his design bureau, he inadvertently allowed Staros to experience the limits of Soviet patience when dealing with foreigners. Creating the Center for Microelectronics Zelenograd, which is a part of Moscow now, a kind of "Silicon Valley" in the suburbs, was the most dangerous step taken by Staros during his tenure in the Soviet Union.

A colleague of Staros recalled:

The designing of the Microelectronics Center was a project undertaken by a group of 5 to 6 people under Staros' supervision. It was very well thought out and planned, not some hare-brained idea. We were young and enthusiastic; Staros knew important people, had a great deal of authority, and a permission from Khrushchev to act freely.

Khrushchev visited our bureau in 1962; he saw with his own eyes the possibilities that the advancement of microelectronics was opening. As a result, he supported the decision to develop the Microelectronics Center.

Several decisions, made together by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, supported the creation of the Microelectronics Center. All of these resolutions were secret; they were never published in the Soviet press. They also allowed for the establishment of the Center for Electronic Engineering in Zelenograd; and later, bureaus in Riga, Minsk, Yerevan and Tbilisi. The Center was modeled after American companies such as IBM, Texas Instruments, and Raytheon. Its founder's native tongue was English; he took American journals home with him every day. No one dared to ask for a meeting with him without first studying the American scientific literature related to the theme of the discussion.

The Microelectronics Center was supposed to include six to seven research institutes, a design bureau, and a training institute. The Center's functions had to be coordinated by the General Director. Staros was appointed as the assistant to the General Director of science, while simultaneously keeping his post as the chief designer of his design bureau in Leningrad. This situation became troublesome for Staros. On one hand, he needed to stay in Leningrad to fight off the criticism of the local party bureaucracy, which was directed against his design bureau. On the other hand, the Zelenograd Center was developing so successfully that Staros' associates decided that they wanted to manage its development without him. In 1964, Staros found himself under attack on two fronts. The secretariat of the Leningrad Regional Committee was very unhappy that the director of an important research organization, which served the military, was a foreigner. In particular, the Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, Grigoriy Romanov, objected to Staros' personnel recruitment policy. Staros hired specialists based solely on their level of expertise. As a result, a politically "unreliable" group of very strong professionals formed inside a Soviet military organization. Among these professionals were many Jews and non-party members. Sensing the unfavorable situation in Leningrad, Staros also became aware that his chances to move to Zelenograd were diminishing as well.

Just as he had in 1950, Staros decided to cut the Gordian knot of his fate with one bold move. He wrote a personal letter to Khrushchev, explaining his problems and complaining about the lack of support from Shokin – the new Electronic Industry Minister. Khrushchev's office received the letter in early October 1964. Unfortunately for Staros, Khrushchev was forced into early retirement a few days later, and the letter ended up on Shokin's desk. His reaction was quite predictable, and in his ensuing conversation with Staros, he warned, "Phillip Georgievich, it seems to me that you suffer from a misconception that you are the creator of Soviet microelectronics. That is simply wrong. The real creator of Soviet microelectronics is the Communist Party, and the sooner you understand this, the better off you will be."

It was clear that Staros could no longer play an independent role in the development of the center he had founded. The following year he was dismissed from his post as the Deputy Director at Zelenograd. In 1973, Staros' design bureau in Leningrad was closed and he spent his remaining years in Vladivostok.

I would like to add a story here that I heard from Burtsev.

In the late 1960s, Petr Stepanovich Pleshakov – who was the Radio Industry Minister back then – called Burtsev to tell him that Staros finished the development of UM1-NX and that he (Burtsev) would be appointed as the Chairman of the State Commission for reviewing the computer.

"Please note," said the minister, "Khrushchev is convinced that this is a remarkable computer, so you have to accept it! The national economy needs it!"

When the Commission began its work, Burtsev prepared a simple test for the computer. The test failed and this delayed the computer's acceptance for six months. During the second trial period, some of the elements burned out. The circuits and the design had to be revised and reworked. On the third try, the Commission – which was headed by Dorodnitsyn now – finally accepted the computer. With Burtsev's help, Staros was able to vindicate himself in Khrushchev's eyes and later received the State Prize for the design of the UM1-NX.

We don't appreciate things until they are gone.^[5]

^[2] Iosef Berg's American name was Joseph Barr, born in New York City in 1916.

^[3] Translator's Note: At present, it is common knowledge in the former Soviet Union that both Staros and Berg were KGB agents while they lived in America. Until the end of his life, Berg, who returned to the United States, insisted he never worked for the KGB. Staros' given name was Alfred Sarant.

^[4] Editor's note: NX are the Russian letters for the initials of Nikita Khrushchev.

^[5] Editor's note: In the original Russian version of this book, Malinovsky refers to the well-known Russian aphorism, Chto imeem – ni khranim, poteryavshi – plachem, which literally means "What we have we don't keep, but having lost it, we cry."