In the 1960s, Soviet scientists proposed building third-generation integrated circuit computers. The majority believed that it was necessary to develop a family of software and hardware-compatible computers. But that was the only point that they agreed upon. Lebedev, having demonstrated the soundness of his ideas and his ability to predict future prospects for development of computer technology, proposed to create a family of small and mid-size general use computers. In addition, he proposed developing a separate supercomputer because its technology would be enormously different (structurally and architecturally) than that of the smaller general use machines.

By the late 1960s, Lebedev, Glushkov, and their followers believed that Soviet scientists had accumulated a significant amount of experience in computer technology and had a considerable production potential. They wanted to collaborate with large Western European computer manufacturers in developing a fourth-generation machine before the Americans did. Lebedev's political adversaries proposed a different option – to duplicate the American third-generation IBM-360 system, created several years earlier. Although no scientists of Lebedev's caliber were among them, they were the political figures who had decision-making power. The Soviet government passed a resolution to develop a Unified System of Computers [in Russian: Yedinaya Systema Elektronnoi Vuichislit'elnoi Mashini, or ES EVM], reverse-engineered from the configurations of the IBM-360^[12]. The Institute for Precision Mechanics was not mentioned in the resolution. When writing the resolution, its authors tried to persuade Sergei Alexeevich to take part in the development of the ES EVM. After consulting with the leading specialists, Lebedev refused, saying: "But we are going to make something extraordinary!" This meant that he would continue his work on supercomputers no matter what.

The decision to copy the IBM-360 may not have had any real consequences for the Institute for Precision Mechanics or any other computer technology outfit if not for a rival organization, the Radio Industry Ministry's Scientific Research Institute of Electronic Computer Technology – or NISEVT [in Russian: Nauchno-Isledovat'elskii Tsenter Elektronno Vuichislit'elnoi Tekhniki], which aspired to be the leader. Sulim, then 40 years old, was appointed Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry. He understood the importance of computer technology for the national economy, and in 1967 initiated a government resolution to construct computer-manufacturing factories throughout the Soviet Union. The resolution also included the creation of the mammoth NISEVT.

According to Sulim's plan, the core computer development organizations, such as SKB-245, the Schetmash, and the Institute for Precision Mechanics, were all to be housed within the NISEVT. But this part of the proposal failed. NISEVT was set up at the SKB-245 – the old rival of the Institute for Precision Mechanics. By now, the latter had established its own unique working culture. Its highly qualified staff could easily estimate the advantages and disadvantages of computers developed abroad and improve their own machines accordingly. In contrast, scientific teams at the huge NISEVT were formed in a hurry and lacked cohesiveness. Even the first-class specialists recruited by NISEVT (only a handful, including Rameev and Vladimir Konstantinovich Levin), failed to fit in or to make any positive changes in the organization. NISEVT continued to clone obsolete foreign computers, while the Soviet government appointed it as the leading group for the development of the ES EVM.

Aware of the government's final decision to copy the IBM-360 system, Sergei Alexeevich – a chain smoker – ignored a life-threatening pulmonary illness to seek a meeting with Minister Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin, to warn him that cloning the IBM-360 would lead to the demise of the Soviet computer industry. He was refused and sent to the Minister's deputy. The visit did not yield any results. After that, Lebedev's illness intensified. Occasionally, there was hope that he would recover, but not for long. Lebedev's strong constitution, undermined by years of stress and endless work, was failing. He was awarded the Order of Lenin on his 70th birthday, and it was presented to him at home. By now, Lebedev was very ill and rarely got out of bed. The prize brought him little pleasure because the cause, to which he had dedicated the most productive years of his life, had suffered.

On July 3, 1974, Golovistikov returned to Moscow from Kiev and visited Sergei Alexeevich at the hospital. Golovistikov told him he had recently visited Feofania, where the MESM had been created. Lebedev listened carefully but did not look at him, staring off into the distance. Petr Petrovich remembered that look for the rest of his life. Then all of the sudden, the gravely ill Lebedev became excited. Perhaps he recalled those hard but happy years spent in Kiev, where he was able to realize his ideas. That was the last day in the life of a great worker, a scientific genius, and a very good man – Sergei Alexeevich Lebedev.

People such as Lebedev stood in the way of the expanding Soviet bureaucracy and its thoughtless decisions. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, Lebedev's predictions came true. In the United Stated and other nations, computer development continued growing in the directions that he originally proposed. By then, foreign countries were developing high-performance supercomputers and personal computers plus a series of smaller, less powerful computers for specialized applications.

The Soviet government spent enormous sums of money on the ES EVM computer family. Copying the IBM-360 caused many problems, extended project deadlines and strained design team efforts. Of course, there was some value in copying this obsolete system in terms of mastering the new technology, developing a vast complex of peripheral units and acquiring new skills in "Sovietizing" computer systems from abroad. Overall, very little progress was made, particularly because IBM-360 documentation was difficult to procure. If one stops to think about the damage caused to the Soviet computer science, to our nation, and to European interests by attempting to make the IBM-360 work for us instead of using our own formidable brainpower and technical skills, it becomes clear that an enormous expenditure of labor, time, and money resulted in marginal benefits at best. The new political reformers – Viktor Yushchenko, Vladimir Putin, and others, must remember the role of science and the impact the truly outstanding scientific minds have on the technological progress and the society as a whole. We must not forget the immortal, heroic deeds of Lebedev, the founder of Soviet computer technology, nor the glorious years during the creation of the MESM and the work at the Lebedev's institute, which greatly advanced the construction of electronic computers by relying on its talented people.

^[12] Editor's Note: Those computer scientists who supported the decision to go with the IMB-360 argue that their ES-EVM series turned out to be very reliable and productive.