Mikhail Sulim belonged to the generation of the eighteen-year-olds most of whom did not return from the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. When the war began, he was studying in Kiev, at a school that specialized in artillery training. At first, the students were evacuated to Dnepropetrovsk, and then to the city of Elek (now Orenburg, Russia) in the Chkalovsky region.
In January 1943, the 18-year old Sulim received his first battle experience near Voronezh. He was serving as the intelligence division commander of the Army's 152-mm howitzer artillery regiment; at the Kursk encirclement, he distinguished himself in the fierce battles near Ponyry and was awarded a First Degree Order of the Patriotic War. Together with the artillery regiment, he reached Berlin in 1945.
After demobilization, he was accepted into the Electro-Technical Department of Kiev Polytechnic Institute and in 1951 graduated with honors, receiving recommendations for post-graduate studies. Naturally, there was no work in the field of digital computer technology yet. Even at Kiev Polytechnic, there were no lectures or research in this discipline, although the MESM was already operational in Kiev. Since the work on MESM was conducted in secrecy, only a very small circle of people knew about it.
Sulim might not have become involved with computers if not for the Deputy Director of Scientific Work at the Moscow Schetmash, who had visited Kiev Polytechnic that year to look for young specialists. He captivated Sulim with his story of the unusual technology that was being developed at an institute in a Moscow – also behind closed doors – where work on Strela, Ural-1, and other computers was underway. Sulim insisted that they send both him and his wife to work at SKB-245. For a long time the couple did not have an apartment and rented a room barely big enough for a bed, a table, and two chairs.
One and half years later, Sulim completed the design for a digital differential analyzer. At the time, the manager of the digital computer department, Rameev, was transferred to Penza where he began manufacturing the Ural-1.
Sulim, who already had the reputation of being a motivated and qualified specialist, was appointed as the manager of Rameev's former department, which had its own construction bureau and workshop for prototypes, where about 150 people worked. By the order of the government, the Schetmash and ITMVT were commissioned to build the M-20 computer. Academician Lebedev had been appointed Chief Designer of the computer and Sulim his deputy.
The research and development of the first four models of the M-20 computer required four years (1955-1959), instead of the projected 2 to 3 years. Managers Lebedev and Sulim set the tone, actively participating in the computer's adjustment. The work pressure grew daily. It is impossible, of course, to convey in a few sentences the agitation and difficulties that accompanied the design of one of the first computers in our nation. Ultimately, it was the enthusiasm of the young specialists that carried the project through. The M-20 computer was the world's champion in operational speed for only three months: such was the price for inadequately developing the element base.
After the M-20 vacuum tube-based computer, Sulim designed the M-220 and M-222 semiconductor models, which had increased storage volume and were software compatible with the M-20. For many years they were mass-manufactured and used in computer centers all over the Soviet Union.
In 1959 when the regional Sovnarkhozes were organized, the 35-year old Sulim was appointed Chief Engineer of the newly founded Soviet State Committee on Radio Electronics. A year later he had become the committee's Operations Manager and Board Member. For five years he supervised the SRI and KB as they developed specialized computing technology and controlled the factories manufacturing computers in various Soviet cities. When in 1965 the Sovnarkhozes were transformed into national branch Ministries – Radio Technology, Electronics, Electro-Technology Industries and others – Sulim was first appointed Manager of the Main Administration of Computer Technology and Board Member of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Radio Industry and then promoted to Deputy Minister. He spent six years in this vital high-level government position, dedicating all of his time to the development of computer technology.
When the Soviet Council of Ministers prepared the resolution to build new and expand existing factories for computer and related component production under the wings of the Ministry of Radio Industry, Ministry of Electro-Technology Industry and the Ministry of Machine Construction, Sulim was given the responsibility for creating a Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology and a series of other institutes.
After the resolution went into effect, Sulim spent most of his time on business trips overseeing the project. Many new plants sprang up and the old ones were rebuilt. Through Sulim's efforts, Moscow's SKB-245 was rapidly transformed into the leading construction bureau in the Ministry of the Radio Industry, while the Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology became the largest computer center in the country.
Sulim was a huge proponent of cooperating with the West in designing the ES project, but Director Krutovskikh of the Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology – who was also appointed General Designer of the ES – did not support Sulim's proposal to collaborate with Western European firms on the design and production of the computer. In fact, he became a strident supporter of copying the American IBM-360 system. During the controversial discussion about the future of the ES computers, Sulim and his followers suffered defeat.
Although I have already discussed some of the details of this meeting, the view I present here is of the person at the epicenter of this political battle, Mikhail Sulim:
Looking back on the discussion regarding the development of Soviet computer technology in the late 1960s and early 1970s – about which much has been written in the foreign press, and unfortunately, almost nothing in our own – I have to say that of the two possible paths of development, we chose the wrong one.
As an innovator and an adamant supporter of our domestic computer technology, who was interested in attracting European companies to work on a new generation of computers, I still consider this the right path. If we had collaborated with the leading European firms, we could have achieved world-class level for mass-produced goods and a solid base for further development of computing technology in a very short time.
The events of recent years have confirmed the correctness of this approach. Moreover, our desire to join the ‘civilized' world would have been strengthened by our practical achievements – we would have already been integrated into the global ‘civilized' society. Regretfully, I consider the past two decades as the years of ‘missed opportunities.'
Today (in the post-Soviet era), we are once again trying to make our way into the ‘civilized' world, but with one significant difference. Back then, we were invited as equals. Now, however, we are trying to get in by any means available, with nothing to offer, driven only by our wish to be ‘civilized.'[7]
In 1970, one of the West German market research institutes wrote a review of the future of computer technology development in the USSR: ‘The Soviet Union possesses enormous scientific and technical potential, but uses it poorly. Their progress in computer science is proceeding very energetically, but, in order to be competitive in the world market, it is necessary to make large investments in this area, and there are very few firms capable of doing this.'
Signing contracts of cooperation between the USSR and the leading European firms would have enhanced technical progress in European countries. Soviet specialists would have received modern equipment without unnecessary competition, because back then, the USSR had too many internal economic problems. Our predictions were accurate – there was interest in working with the USSR, the contract proposals, the desire to give assistance and train people. The only problem is, these agreements were never realized. Due to the events of recent years, we lost our great scientific-technical potential and hence, our foreign would-be partners have lost interest in collaborating with us. At the same time, our needs for advanced technology have only multiplied. It is still possible to rectify this situation today; tomorrow, it will be too late – what's left of our great potential will disappear into the chaos.
Protesting the Soviet government's decision to copy the IBM-360, Sulim resigned as Deputy Minister and was appointed Director of the Moscow Schetmash. Working there, he successfully defended his Candidate and Doctoral theses, while the Soviet computer industry slowly collapsed on itself.
[7] Editor's note: The "civilized society" Sulim mentions here refers to Western Europe and the United States, where the Soviet Union was often viewed as backwards or as a third-world country. Sulim's regret comes from the Soviet Union's inability to join the United States and Europe in the modern, efficient, and essentially straightforward system of government, business practices, and rule of law, the lack of which currently plague the former Soviet Republics.