One of the most notable periods in the history of Soviet computer development began in Leningrad in the late 1950s, with the work of a group directed by Philip Georgievich Staros and his closest assistant, Iosef Veniaminovich Berg. They were the first ones in the Soviet Union to achieve significant results creating computer models with microelectronic controls and were instrumental in organizing the Zelenograd Scientific Center for Microelectronics with branches in several cities in the Soviet Union.
In 1956, one of Leningrad's scientific development organizations established the special secret laboratory, SL-11. There, scientists created experimental models of film microcircuits, integral multi-hole ferrite plates for memory devices, and computer logic units with low energy consumption. After visiting SL-11 in 1959, Dmitri Ustinov – he was the chairman of the Military Industrial Commission of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers back then – organized an independent construction bureau under Staros. By 1961 it was christened Construction Bureau-2 (KB-2) of Electronic Technology.
KB-2's first major project was the record breaking two-year development of the UM1-NX control computer.
In 1962, the UM1-NX was approved by a State Commission headed by Academician Dorodnitsyn and slated for mass-production. The computer became the forerunner of a new class of technology – microelectronic control computers. Although the logic part of the UM1-NX and read-only memory (ROM) of constants and instructions used discrete elements, it was the first computer that realized the principals and technical advances of microelectronics. The essential distinguishing features of this computer were its low cost and high reliability in industrial conditions. For example, during the first 12,000 hours of operation in metallurgical production control system at the Cherepovetsk Metallurgical Factory, the machine's failure-free index registered over 1500 working hours.
The Americans recognized UM1-NX as the world's first mini-computer. In a review of Soviet computers published in Control Engineering, (no. 5, 1966) with the title "Desktop Model," the UM1-NX was described as "remarkable" for its size and low energy consumption.
According to a resolution of the Central Committee and the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers, the UM1-NX was manufactured at the Leningrad Electromechanical Plant [in Russian: Leningradskii elektromekhanicheskii zavod, or LEMZ]. Using variable units designed for the UM1-NX computer, the LEMZ filled many industrial orders for control complexes.
In November 1969, Staros and his co-workers were awarded the Soviet State Prize for their work on the UM1-NX control computer complexes and their usage in the first digital control system in various branches of the Soviet economy. Simultaneously, KB-2 was researching microelectronics, creating experimental models of micro-miniature logic and storage elements for computers, and developing ideas and methodologies for construction of microelectronic equipment.
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited KB-2 on May 4, 1962. He was accompanied by Defense Minister Ustinov, Senior Naval Commander Sergei Gorshkov, Electronic Industry Minister A. I. Shokin, and a number of other high-level managers from the military-industrial complex. Staros presented a succinct report (Khrushchev loved reports of this style) about the significance of microelectronics for the national defense and general scientific-technical progress in the Soviet Union. During Staros' report, working models of microelectronic computing technology were demonstrated: UM1-NX microchips and integral storage devices, and prototypes of equipment for simulation of fighter aircraft maneuvers and pilot decision-making during air battles. The report concluded with Staros' proposal to build a Scientific Microelectronic Center.
Within a month after Khrushchev's visit, the Central Committee and Soviet Council of Ministers (without a doubt, setting a record for bureaucratic brevity), passed a resolution to construct the Zelenograd Scientific Center for Microelectronics with branches in Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Vilnius, and a few other cities. The project envisioned intense development of all microelectronic components for various branches of the economy, especially for science and electronic machine building.
During his first two years at Zelenograd, Staros was the Deputy General Scientific Director of the new center, while remaining the Chief Designer at the KB-2.
Under Staros, the UM-2 microcomputer was developed at the KB-2 in 1964. This computer was designated for aerospace applications. Besides an advanced structure, UM-2 had an original circuit scheme and other technological features, which greatly influenced the development of on-board computing devices in later years.
The design of the UM-2 computer, with its elegant architecture and technology, later found applications in these two areas: the Electronika K-200 control computer, which weighed about 120 kg and had an operating speed of 40,000 operations per second, and the Electronika K-201 control complex, with upgraded input-output peripheral devices. They were both manufactured in the late 1960s at the Rubin plant-complex in Pskov. During the 1970s, the Electronika K-200 and the systems based on it, were widely used in industrial control, specifically in the electronics industry.
The UM-2 computer also was used in the Uzel multi-purpose control system for small Naval submarines.[1] The Uzel system successfully passed state testing and was produced at the Pskov Rubin Complex. It was delivered to various naval installations during the 1970s and 1980s.
In the early 1970s under Staros' management, KB-2 created the first large integrated circuits for micro calculators, which were manufactured by the Svetlana Industrial Amalgamated Complex. They achieved this months before other microelectronic enterprises, due to the use of CAD-systems based on mini-computers and a powerful topological design system, which at the time was based on the BESM-6 computer.
The development of large-scale integral circuits for micro calculators became the basis of the Electronika-S5 – the first Soviet-made family of single-circuit board, multi-board and single-chip microcomputers for control of industry processes. Particularly noteworthy is the single-chip microcomputer S5-31, developed in cooperation with the Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics. Its originality was noted by American scientists.
After Staros' KB-2 complex merged with Svetlana in 1974, Staros moved to Vladivostok to work at the Far East Scientific Center, where he managed research on artificial intelligence using modern microelectronic technology. He died in 1979; almost every pioneer of Soviet microelectronics and microcomputers attended his funeral in Moscow.
[1] Translator's Note: The Russian word "uzel" means "node."
I met Philip Staros at his Leningrad institute only once, while I was there on business. At that time, I didn't think that I would ever write about him so I did not try to remember every detail of our meeting.
Staros was a popular personality among computer specialists. The UM1-NX (developed at his institute) was the first microelectronic control computer. Even though I and other designers of control computers were familiar with the machine, very few people (including myself) knew that its designer was born, educated, and received his initial microelectronics experience in the United States.
Vitaly Valkov, Staros' colleague of many years, shared with me some details of the relationship between Staros and another American engineer, Iosef Berg.[2] They were, respectively, the Chief Designer-Constructor and Chief Engineer of KB-2, one of the primary computer design bureaus with strong ties to the Soviet military. It is almost certain that someone in the Soviet government, perhaps Khrushchev himself, helped both Staros and Berg to come to the Soviet Union from Czechoslovakia; both arrived around late 1955, early 1956. Staros came with his American wife and four children; Berg – with his Czech wife.
Valkov suggested that Staros' success in the Soviet Union was due to three factors: the Soviet military managed his work starting in 1956, he had the bearings of a man educated in the United States along with Western engineering experience, and he was a gifted researcher and a skilled manager of large teams.
The military had direct access to the highest levels of the Soviet bureaucracy, thus military projects received high priority and stood a better chance of successful realization.
Although it is not clear who invited Staros to come to the Soviet Union, there is very little doubt that Soviet authorities held him in great regard from the very beginning of his career. His monthly salary was significantly higher than any other scientist's at Zelenograd and even higher than that of many Soviet ministers.[3]
According to Valkov, Alfred Epaminodas Sarant received his bachelor's degree in electronics from Cooper Union University in New York City in 1941. He worked in communication systems design in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and at a nuclear physics laboratory at Cornell University, where he participated in the construction of a cyclotron. In 1950, he went to work for Bell Laboratories gaining experience in communication systems and radar technology; he also gained some knowledge about the first American computers and electronic equipment for the cyclotron. Until 1944, Sarant was a member of the American Communist Party and he, Berg, and Julius Rosenberg belonged to the same communist party group and spy ring.
Just after the Rosenbergs' arrest in the summer of 1950, the Federal Bureau of Investigation interrogated Sarant. After the interrogation, he received permission to visit his relatives in New York. Shortly after, using false documents, he crossed the American-Mexican border and later appeared in Czechoslovakia; the name ‘Sarant' disappeared from publication. Five years later, the American engineer Phillip Staros arrived in the Soviet Union.
The calculation and control computers designed by Philip Staros received high praise both in the Soviet Union and in the West. In 1964, the popular magazine Soviet Union featured UM1-NX computer, where it was described to weigh 65 kg, and have operating energy consumption of only 100 watts; it consisted of eight thousand transistors with approximately ten thousand resistors and capacitors. During its testing period, it performed failure-free for 250 hours.
A small circle of people close to Staros joked that "NX" stood for Nikita Khrushchev, so it could be said that the computer was named in honor of the benefactor of Staros' construction bureau.[4]
Another control computer developed by Staros that gained attention in the West was the Electronika K-200. It weighed approximately 120 kilograms and could performed 40 thousand operations per second. The American critics who reviewed this machine remarked, "Many of its features would not be considered original in the West, but the appearance of such features in a Soviet computer is extremely uncommon. The K-200 was the first Soviet-produced computer that may be considered well-designed and amazingly up-to-date." They even complimented the use of contemporary English technical jargon that accompanied the description of the machine. Naturally, had the critics known that the machine's designer was an American electrical engineer who followed American developments in this field, they would not have been so surprised or generous with their praise.
Whatever the source of his knowledge, it must be recognized that Staros was able to achieve many significant accomplishments during his time in the Soviet Union.
One of Staros' Soviet colleagues, who now lives in the West, claims that Staros was first in the Soviet Union to draw attention to the new field of computer technology, which is now called microelectronics. Staros took the first step in this direction during a presentation on microelectronics in November 1958. All of the principal developers and leaders of design bureaus, representing the entire Soviet electronics industry, were present at this meeting.
In 1961, a new powerful State Committee was formed. In 1965, it was followed by the Ministry of the Electronic Industry, headed by Alexander Shokin. The purpose for creating this ministry was to increase the production of basic electronic components without which it was impossible to make radar equipment or computers. The government pinned enormous hopes on the Ministry of the Electronic Industry and its placement in the middle of the so-called "nine sisters" – nine industrial ministries, most of which were involved in defense production. Shokin's position was very strong and vulnerable at the same time because he was under constant pressure to produce practical results. This explains why he was so willing to support Staros and his plans. But by encouraging Staros to expand his design bureau, he inadvertently allowed Staros to experience the limits of Soviet patience when dealing with foreigners. Creating the Center for Microelectronics Zelenograd, which is a part of Moscow now, a kind of "Silicon Valley" in the suburbs, was the most dangerous step taken by Staros during his tenure in the Soviet Union.
A colleague of Staros recalled:
The designing of the Microelectronics Center was a project undertaken by a group of 5 to 6 people under Staros' supervision. It was very well thought out and planned, not some hare-brained idea. We were young and enthusiastic; Staros knew important people, had a great deal of authority, and a permission from Khrushchev to act freely.
Khrushchev visited our bureau in 1962; he saw with his own eyes the possibilities that the advancement of microelectronics was opening. As a result, he supported the decision to develop the Microelectronics Center.
Several decisions, made together by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, supported the creation of the Microelectronics Center. All of these resolutions were secret; they were never published in the Soviet press. They also allowed for the establishment of the Center for Electronic Engineering in Zelenograd; and later, bureaus in Riga, Minsk, Yerevan and Tbilisi. The Center was modeled after American companies such as IBM, Texas Instruments, and Raytheon. Its founder's native tongue was English; he took American journals home with him every day. No one dared to ask for a meeting with him without first studying the American scientific literature related to the theme of the discussion.
The Microelectronics Center was supposed to include six to seven research institutes, a design bureau, and a training institute. The Center's functions had to be coordinated by the General Director. Staros was appointed as the assistant to the General Director of science, while simultaneously keeping his post as the chief designer of his design bureau in Leningrad. This situation became troublesome for Staros. On one hand, he needed to stay in Leningrad to fight off the criticism of the local party bureaucracy, which was directed against his design bureau. On the other hand, the Zelenograd Center was developing so successfully that Staros' associates decided that they wanted to manage its development without him. In 1964, Staros found himself under attack on two fronts. The secretariat of the Leningrad Regional Committee was very unhappy that the director of an important research organization, which served the military, was a foreigner. In particular, the Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, Grigoriy Romanov, objected to Staros' personnel recruitment policy. Staros hired specialists based solely on their level of expertise. As a result, a politically "unreliable" group of very strong professionals formed inside a Soviet military organization. Among these professionals were many Jews and non-party members. Sensing the unfavorable situation in Leningrad, Staros also became aware that his chances to move to Zelenograd were diminishing as well.
Just as he had in 1950, Staros decided to cut the Gordian knot of his fate with one bold move. He wrote a personal letter to Khrushchev, explaining his problems and complaining about the lack of support from Shokin – the new Electronic Industry Minister. Khrushchev's office received the letter in early October 1964. Unfortunately for Staros, Khrushchev was forced into early retirement a few days later, and the letter ended up on Shokin's desk. His reaction was quite predictable, and in his ensuing conversation with Staros, he warned, "Phillip Georgievich, it seems to me that you suffer from a misconception that you are the creator of Soviet microelectronics. That is simply wrong. The real creator of Soviet microelectronics is the Communist Party, and the sooner you understand this, the better off you will be."
It was clear that Staros could no longer play an independent role in the development of the center he had founded. The following year he was dismissed from his post as the Deputy Director at Zelenograd. In 1973, Staros' design bureau in Leningrad was closed and he spent his remaining years in Vladivostok.
I would like to add a story here that I heard from Burtsev.
In the late 1960s, Petr Stepanovich Pleshakov – who was the Radio Industry Minister back then – called Burtsev to tell him that Staros finished the development of UM1-NX and that he (Burtsev) would be appointed as the Chairman of the State Commission for reviewing the computer.
"Please note," said the minister, "Khrushchev is convinced that this is a remarkable computer, so you have to accept it! The national economy needs it!"
When the Commission began its work, Burtsev prepared a simple test for the computer. The test failed and this delayed the computer's acceptance for six months. During the second trial period, some of the elements burned out. The circuits and the design had to be revised and reworked. On the third try, the Commission – which was headed by Dorodnitsyn now – finally accepted the computer. With Burtsev's help, Staros was able to vindicate himself in Khrushchev's eyes and later received the State Prize for the design of the UM1-NX.
We don't appreciate things until they are gone.[5]
[2] Iosef Berg's American name was Joseph Barr, born in New York City in 1916.
[3] Translator's Note: At present, it is common knowledge in the former Soviet Union that both Staros and Berg were KGB agents while they lived in America. Until the end of his life, Berg, who returned to the United States, insisted he never worked for the KGB. Staros' given name was Alfred Sarant.
[4] Editor's note: NX are the Russian letters for the initials of Nikita Khrushchev.
[5] Editor's note: In the original Russian version of this book, Malinovsky refers to the well-known Russian aphorism, Chto imeem – ni khranim, poteryavshi – plachem, which literally means "What we have we don't keep, but having lost it, we cry."
The Soviet government and its leaders made significant strides in computer development during the period immediately following the end of the Great Patriotic War. They considered this issue to be the most critical for the national economy, despite the acute need for capital investments in rebuilding the war devastated country and philosophical polemics on the role of cybernetics in society.
The Central Committee and Council of Ministers established the ITMVT, SKB-245, and the Schetmash by 1948. At the same time, the government's budget was expanded to accommodate economic growth. One should remember that in the early 1950s the Soviet Union was producing only a small number of punch-card calculators: electronic calculating technology was in its infancy and lacked production resources for basic components.
The development of a modern computer production base came at the end of the 1950s, after the successful completion of the first industrial models of electronic computers: the M-20, the Ural-1, and the Minsk-1, the forerunners of the semiconductor computers M-220, Ural-11, 14, Minsk-22 and -32, which were issued in the 1960s. These were the basic models available in the Soviet Union before the third generation of computers began production in the early 1970s.
Beginning in the early 1950s, the Moscow SAM plant and the Penza EVM plant were the main producers of those machines, later joined by the Minsk Mathematical Machine factory, the Astrakhan Progress plant, and several other factories. In 1955-56, there was a significant expansion of scientific research and construction bases across the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, they were all prepared to mass-produce semiconductor computers. By 1964, the manufacturing of the first generation of computers stopped and in 1965, the production of semiconductor computers commenced with Ural-11, Ural-14, Minsk-22, Minsk-23, BESM-4, Razdan-3, and others.
Notably, most of this developmental phase coincided with the fact that the Soviet national economy consisted of regional economic councils, or Sovnarkhozes, which dealt with all basic production issues in the Soviet Union.[6] At the same time, all computer scientific research was managed by the State Committee on Radio Electronics, governing scientific research institutes for electronic machine construction (SRIs), and electronics construction bureaus (KBs).
This separation of science and manufacturing into different departments was not the most efficient method of production, although it had positive aspects – the operational assistance to companies involved in mass-production was approved much faster and implemented more efficiently.
In 1965-1966, the national economy was restructured again to a branch control system and all SRIs and KBs for computer technology came under the control of two ministries: the Soviet Ministry of the Radio Industry, responsible for universal and specialized computers, and the Ministry of Machine Construction, responsible for Automation and Control Systems. This restructuring of the Soviet economic system coincided with the beginning of work on the third generation computers based on integral microchips.
The difficulties of this period consisted not only of solving scientific and technological problems (ranging from general architecture to the element base of the new computers), but also complex problems of creating a new branch of computer technology based on new methods and never before manufactured equipment. Shifting of economic policy from a defunct regional control system to an internal branch structure only contributed more problems. In many cases, the development of the next generation of computers happened simultaneously with the construction of production plants and training of personnel.
Due to the economic restructuring and high production quotas demanded by the Soviet government, we had to solve all of these problems in three to five years, more than triple the volume of computer production, and make many internal components and peripheral devices. This required the development and implementation of mass-production of a universal family of software-compatible computers that would be constructed at a single technological installation.
The drastic reduction in research and development timetables was predicated on the assumption that we would be able to sign contracts with leading Western firms to legally obtain their expertise, as well as utilize all of the available domestic experts to design and manufacture these new computers. On December 30, 1967, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union along with the Council of Ministers issued a government decree, Resolution No. 1180/420. This was an order for the creation of domestic computer technology collectives that would offer solutions to every problem – from development and implementation of production materials and base components to the guaranteed production of a new generation of computers and the increased effectiveness of their integration into the national economy. The order provided for:
A budget increase in the production means for computer manufacturing from 304 million rubles in 1965 to 1 billion rubles in 1970 and 3 billion in 1975.
An increase in computer output (income) from 2.47 billion rubles in 1966-1970 to 7.5 billion rubles in 1971-1975.Growth of annual computer output from 5,800 in 1966-1970 to 20,000 computers in 1971-1975.
The order called for the construction of up to 28 new plants and the expansion of 22 existing plants – their operational-industrial space during 1968-1975 increased by more than 2 million square meters.
Appropriate decisions were taken for the development of computer components, practically starting from zero to 65 million integral circuits (microchips) per year.
The program outlined above was, of course, "top of the line." It was not fully realized, but supported the expansion of production resources, and enabled the Soviet Union to nearly double its computer output capacity. Thanks to this resolution, during 1968-1985, manufacturing plants for computer devices and components were built in Kiev, Boyarka, Kanev, Vinnitsa, Kamenets-Podolskii, and Odessa. And this was just in Ukraine. The production potential at other existing plants throughout the Soviet Union, in cities such as Minsk, Brest, Kazan, Kishinev, and others, increased significantly.
When the government decided to build the ES system, nearly 100 organizations and enterprises including 200,000 scientists, engineers and technicians, as well as about 300,000 workers from the Soviet republics, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were involved in the project.
One leader who made a huge contribution to the Soviet computer industry was Mikhail Kirillovich Sulim. He served as Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry and was a close associate of Glushkov, with whom he worked to save the development of the domestic computer technology. After our long conversation and reading the documents that he shared with me, I realized that the Soviet past still haunted him, but no less than the complexities of the present day in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
[6] Translator's Note: These were regional economic councils established by Khrushchev.
Mikhail Sulim belonged to the generation of the eighteen-year-olds most of whom did not return from the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. When the war began, he was studying in Kiev, at a school that specialized in artillery training. At first, the students were evacuated to Dnepropetrovsk, and then to the city of Elek (now Orenburg, Russia) in the Chkalovsky region.
In January 1943, the 18-year old Sulim received his first battle experience near Voronezh. He was serving as the intelligence division commander of the Army's 152-mm howitzer artillery regiment; at the Kursk encirclement, he distinguished himself in the fierce battles near Ponyry and was awarded a First Degree Order of the Patriotic War. Together with the artillery regiment, he reached Berlin in 1945.
After demobilization, he was accepted into the Electro-Technical Department of Kiev Polytechnic Institute and in 1951 graduated with honors, receiving recommendations for post-graduate studies. Naturally, there was no work in the field of digital computer technology yet. Even at Kiev Polytechnic, there were no lectures or research in this discipline, although the MESM was already operational in Kiev. Since the work on MESM was conducted in secrecy, only a very small circle of people knew about it.
Sulim might not have become involved with computers if not for the Deputy Director of Scientific Work at the Moscow Schetmash, who had visited Kiev Polytechnic that year to look for young specialists. He captivated Sulim with his story of the unusual technology that was being developed at an institute in a Moscow – also behind closed doors – where work on Strela, Ural-1, and other computers was underway. Sulim insisted that they send both him and his wife to work at SKB-245. For a long time the couple did not have an apartment and rented a room barely big enough for a bed, a table, and two chairs.
One and half years later, Sulim completed the design for a digital differential analyzer. At the time, the manager of the digital computer department, Rameev, was transferred to Penza where he began manufacturing the Ural-1.
Sulim, who already had the reputation of being a motivated and qualified specialist, was appointed as the manager of Rameev's former department, which had its own construction bureau and workshop for prototypes, where about 150 people worked. By the order of the government, the Schetmash and ITMVT were commissioned to build the M-20 computer. Academician Lebedev had been appointed Chief Designer of the computer and Sulim his deputy.
The research and development of the first four models of the M-20 computer required four years (1955-1959), instead of the projected 2 to 3 years. Managers Lebedev and Sulim set the tone, actively participating in the computer's adjustment. The work pressure grew daily. It is impossible, of course, to convey in a few sentences the agitation and difficulties that accompanied the design of one of the first computers in our nation. Ultimately, it was the enthusiasm of the young specialists that carried the project through. The M-20 computer was the world's champion in operational speed for only three months: such was the price for inadequately developing the element base.
After the M-20 vacuum tube-based computer, Sulim designed the M-220 and M-222 semiconductor models, which had increased storage volume and were software compatible with the M-20. For many years they were mass-manufactured and used in computer centers all over the Soviet Union.
In 1959 when the regional Sovnarkhozes were organized, the 35-year old Sulim was appointed Chief Engineer of the newly founded Soviet State Committee on Radio Electronics. A year later he had become the committee's Operations Manager and Board Member. For five years he supervised the SRI and KB as they developed specialized computing technology and controlled the factories manufacturing computers in various Soviet cities. When in 1965 the Sovnarkhozes were transformed into national branch Ministries – Radio Technology, Electronics, Electro-Technology Industries and others – Sulim was first appointed Manager of the Main Administration of Computer Technology and Board Member of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Radio Industry and then promoted to Deputy Minister. He spent six years in this vital high-level government position, dedicating all of his time to the development of computer technology.
When the Soviet Council of Ministers prepared the resolution to build new and expand existing factories for computer and related component production under the wings of the Ministry of Radio Industry, Ministry of Electro-Technology Industry and the Ministry of Machine Construction, Sulim was given the responsibility for creating a Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology and a series of other institutes.
After the resolution went into effect, Sulim spent most of his time on business trips overseeing the project. Many new plants sprang up and the old ones were rebuilt. Through Sulim's efforts, Moscow's SKB-245 was rapidly transformed into the leading construction bureau in the Ministry of the Radio Industry, while the Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology became the largest computer center in the country.
Sulim was a huge proponent of cooperating with the West in designing the ES project, but Director Krutovskikh of the Scientific Research Center for Computer Technology – who was also appointed General Designer of the ES – did not support Sulim's proposal to collaborate with Western European firms on the design and production of the computer. In fact, he became a strident supporter of copying the American IBM-360 system. During the controversial discussion about the future of the ES computers, Sulim and his followers suffered defeat.
Although I have already discussed some of the details of this meeting, the view I present here is of the person at the epicenter of this political battle, Mikhail Sulim:
Looking back on the discussion regarding the development of Soviet computer technology in the late 1960s and early 1970s – about which much has been written in the foreign press, and unfortunately, almost nothing in our own – I have to say that of the two possible paths of development, we chose the wrong one.
As an innovator and an adamant supporter of our domestic computer technology, who was interested in attracting European companies to work on a new generation of computers, I still consider this the right path. If we had collaborated with the leading European firms, we could have achieved world-class level for mass-produced goods and a solid base for further development of computing technology in a very short time.
The events of recent years have confirmed the correctness of this approach. Moreover, our desire to join the ‘civilized' world would have been strengthened by our practical achievements – we would have already been integrated into the global ‘civilized' society. Regretfully, I consider the past two decades as the years of ‘missed opportunities.'
Today (in the post-Soviet era), we are once again trying to make our way into the ‘civilized' world, but with one significant difference. Back then, we were invited as equals. Now, however, we are trying to get in by any means available, with nothing to offer, driven only by our wish to be ‘civilized.'[7]
In 1970, one of the West German market research institutes wrote a review of the future of computer technology development in the USSR: ‘The Soviet Union possesses enormous scientific and technical potential, but uses it poorly. Their progress in computer science is proceeding very energetically, but, in order to be competitive in the world market, it is necessary to make large investments in this area, and there are very few firms capable of doing this.'
Signing contracts of cooperation between the USSR and the leading European firms would have enhanced technical progress in European countries. Soviet specialists would have received modern equipment without unnecessary competition, because back then, the USSR had too many internal economic problems. Our predictions were accurate – there was interest in working with the USSR, the contract proposals, the desire to give assistance and train people. The only problem is, these agreements were never realized. Due to the events of recent years, we lost our great scientific-technical potential and hence, our foreign would-be partners have lost interest in collaborating with us. At the same time, our needs for advanced technology have only multiplied. It is still possible to rectify this situation today; tomorrow, it will be too late – what's left of our great potential will disappear into the chaos.
Protesting the Soviet government's decision to copy the IBM-360, Sulim resigned as Deputy Minister and was appointed Director of the Moscow Schetmash. Working there, he successfully defended his Candidate and Doctoral theses, while the Soviet computer industry slowly collapsed on itself.
[7] Editor's note: The "civilized society" Sulim mentions here refers to Western Europe and the United States, where the Soviet Union was often viewed as backwards or as a third-world country. Sulim's regret comes from the Soviet Union's inability to join the United States and Europe in the modern, efficient, and essentially straightforward system of government, business practices, and rule of law, the lack of which currently plague the former Soviet Republics.